




International Trade Highlights in 1995
I. Introduction
Since World War II, the United States has articulated and pursued a policy
of free and fair trade. The highlights of trade policy in any particular year focus
on the extent to which the United States focuses on free trade or fair trade, and
the means employed to promote its policy.
Immediately following World War II, the United States took the lead, with
Great Britain, in establishing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) as a complement to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
With the GATT's institution and dramatic success in reducing tariffs through
successive rounds of negotiations, U.S. trade policy was predominantly multilat-
eral. "Plurilateral" was a word that was not applied to trade until recently,
and relatively few major trade initiatives before the 1980s were bilateral. The
antidumping and countervailing duty laws-providing for the unilateral imposi-
tion of offsetting duties, but authorized generally by the GATT-existed and
applied, but did not generally have a major impact on trade before the 1980s.
The tools used by the United States to pursue its free and fair trade policy
began to change significantly in 1982. In that year, U.S. Trade Representative
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Bill Brock tried but failed to persuade trading partners, starting with the European
Community (EC), to launch another round of multilateral trade negotiations to
follow the Tokyo Round negotiations concluded and implemented in 1979. EC
trade policy at the time was largely self-absorbed with its single market initiative,
enlargement, relations with the European Free Trade Association countries, and,
later, the reunification of Germany and relations with the republics of the former
Soviet Union.
Frustrated in the desire to promote further trade liberalization through the
traditional multilateral means, Ambassador Brock pursued other means. During
his tenure as U.S. Trade Representative, the United States concluded its first
free trade agreement with Israel, newly emphasizing bilateral trade avenues. Also
during this time, trade tensions between the United States and Japan began to
increase, resulting in nearly continuous bilateral negotiations between the two
governments ever since, often with a high profile.
Ambassador Brock's successor, Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, then led U.S.
negotiations with Canada of a second free trade agreement. The Bush Administra-
tion Trade Representative, Ambassador Carla A. Hills, then led negotiations
essentially broadening the bilateral U.S.-Canada agreement into the plurilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Moreover, President Bush
promoted an Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, under which the NAFTA
could be expanded to include democratic, free market economies through negotia-
tions.
Following his inauguration, President Clinton persuaded the Congress to enact
legislation implementing the NAFTA and, as President Bush, proposed NAFTA's
expansion southward through initial negotiations with the Republic of Chile.
Thus, from the inception of the NAFTA negotiations, the United States has newly
emphasized plurilateral trade options, which are also reflected in the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative and the more recent TransAtlantic Dia-
logue.
Also beginning in the 1980s, the United States increased its resort to and use
of its pre-1934 primary avenue for making trade policy, unilateral action. In his
second term, in response to alarming U.S. trade and current account deficits and
the political pressure they generated, President Reagan initiated investigations
of foreign governments' unfair trade practices, imposed sanctions in many cases,
and impliedly threatened to take such measures in many more cases. This more
aggressive, unilateral approach to resolving trade problems was emulated subse-
quently by both Presidents Bush and Clinton.
The last fifteen years, therefore, have witnessed a shift in the tools used by
the United States in pursuing free and fair trade objectives. Whereas U.S. trade
policy from 1947 to 1982 was overwhelmingly multilaterally based, non-
multilateral means have received more emphasis since then. However, this per-
spective is tempered by the multilateral backdrop of the U.S. plurilateral, bilateral,
and unilateral actions in the launch of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations
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in 1986, their conclusion in December 1993, their legislative implementation in
the United States in 1994, and the entry into force of the GATT successor World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Indeed, most U.S. trade negotiators during
this period heavily credit the combination of U.S. plurilateral, bilateral, and
unilateral trade activities as spurring both the launch and the successful conclusion
of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
Since the United States continues to use all these means-multilateral, plurilat-
eral, bilateral, and unilateral (or national)-as tools with which to implement its
trade policy, this article reviews the highlights in each of these arenas in 1995.
II. Key Multilateral Developments
by Judith Hippler Bello
The year 1995 reasonably should have been the year of the WTO. After nearly
fifty years, the GATT began its eclipse on January 1, 1995, the date the Agreement
Establishing the WTO entered into force. While the GATT formally continued
to exist through December 31, 1995, the WTO was the forum for multilateral
trade liberalization.
A. SELECTION OF THE WTO DIRECTOR-GENERAL
The WTO began in the long-running Uruguay Round to facilitate the more
comprehensive work and agenda of the Geneva-based multilateral trade organiza-
tion. The Agreement provides for a Ministerial Conference of all WTO Members
that convenes at least every other year. In the interim, the day-to-day work of
the organization is accomplished through a General Council, which oversees
subsidiary councils for trade in goods, trade in services, and intellectual property
protection, as well as a Dispute Settlement Body, Trade Policy Review Body,
and various committees (such as the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restric-
tions).
In addition to a more formal structure and broader scope, the WTO also has
a necessarily larger staff, or Secretariat. The chief executive officer of this staff
is the Director-General, who oversees the administrative and professional func-
tions of the Secretariat, serves as the chief spokesman of the organization, and
seeks to lead Members in a harmonious direction. While the power resides with
Members, the Director-General is a key position that enables an effective leader
to wield significant influence, as did Director-General Peter Sutherland in facili-
tating closure in the Uruguay Round. Sutherland earned widespread respect for
his exercise of these responsibilities, but he gave the GATT Contracting Parties
notice that he would not stay on to serve as the Director-General of the new
WTO.
The United States, European Union (EU), Canada, Japan, and other trading
partners thus embarked in 1994 on the selection of a successor to the able Suther-
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land. However, rather than working quietly and discreetly toward consensus,
major nations each advocated a regional champion for the number one WTO
job. The United States backed Mexican President Carlos Salinas, the visionary
and then political hero who proposed and negotiated the NAFTA. The EU settled
on former Italian Trade Minister Renato Ruggiero, and many Asian nations
supported former Korean Trade Minister Chulsu Kim. Instead of focusing consen-
sually on a candidate to unite Members, the three major trading blocks seemed
to duel over whose candidate would emerge the winner of regional combat.
The United States wisely proposed President Salinas for the top WTO job in
1994. However, political and economic conditions in Mexico changed markedly
later in the year, by which time President Zedillo succeeded President Salinas.
By December 1994, Mexican currency reserves declined so precipitously that
the Zedillo administration devalued the peso. The devaluation triggered a crisis
of confidence, stemmed only by controversial U.S. assistance to Mexico through
the Economic Stabilization Fund, some additional assistance from other major
trading partners, and the International Monetary Fund. In the meantime, however,
the Mexican crisis risked a tequila effect in other Latin American financial centers,
particularly those with weak banking regulatory systems.
Mexico's financial woes, combined with political assassinations and scandal,
cast an impenetrable cloud over former President Salinas's candidacy. The United
States loyally persisted in supporting him, but his prospects first dimmed, then
died.
The EU continued to advocate former Minister Ruggiero, and many Asian
nations favored former Minister Kim. Both candidates prompted widespread
concern, reflecting in part the criticism of the rate and extent of trade liberalization
in Italy and Korea. Ultimately, however, the United States had to decide whether
to seek to reopen the selection process, field a new North American candidate,
or accept one of the remaining two candidates. After conflicting statements in
early 1995, the United States finally agreed to support Mr. Ruggiero.' The Asian
supporters of Mr. Kim also agreed to accept Mr. Ruggiero, provided Mr. Kim
would be made a new (fifth) Deputy Director-General.
Finally in late March 1995, nearly three months after the WTO Agreement
went into effect, Mr. Ruggiero became Director-General. While he may well
perform with distinction in this position, the manner of the Director-General's
selection, and in particular the parties' inability to reach consensus on time, did
not reflect well on the new organization.
1. E.g., "U.S. Rejects Remaining Candidates for WTO, Calls for 'New Process,' " Inside
U.S. Trade 1 (March 3, 1995); "Kantor Says U.S. Not Opposed to Any Candidate for WTO Post,"
Inside U.S. Trade 3 (March 10, 1995).
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B. FINANCIAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS
Of the many issues facing the new WTO and its even newer Director-General,
none was more pressing than the deadline for concluding negotiations on financial
services. As the Uruguay Round neared its conclusion in December 1993, the
United States Government and private sector remained dissatisfied with the offers
other GATT Contracting Parties made on financial services. The U.S. negotiating
team, led by the Department of the Treasury, was unwilling to conclude an
agreement under which the already relatively open U.S. market would be locked
open, but foreign markets would remain relatively closed. However unlikely the
possibility that the United States would close its financial services market to
services providers from closed markets, nonetheless the United States insisted on
retaining the right to take such action as leverage in its continuing market-opening
negotiations.
As the logjam broke in other negotiating groups in Geneva in late 1993, the
United States judged the financial services package still deficient. On the one
hand, the United States did not wish to push financial services off the table (as
was the case for civil aviation, which, with minor exceptions, is not covered
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services2). On the other hand, the
United States did not wish to embrace a lopsided agreement.
Instead, negotiators found a third way: the United States obtained a Ministerial
Decision on Financial Services that essentially prolonged the financial services
negotiations and kept options opened. Specifically, Members agreed that the
financial services commitments they scheduled would enter into force on a most-
favored-nation (MFN) basis at the same time that the Agreement Establishing
the WTO entered into force. However, they further agreed that for six months
following such entry into force, Members would be free to improve, modify,
or withdraw all or part of such financial commitments without offering compensa-
tion. In other words, Members could change their minds and their commitments.
The entry into force of the WTO Agreement on January 1, 1995, started the
clock ticking toward the June 30 deadline for conclusion of the financial services
renegotiations. By mid-March, the negotiations did not pick up significant mo-
mentum. Only eight countries met the March 15 deadline for submitting initial
conditional offers. Of the major developing country markets of interest to the
United States, only Hong Kong and Korea tabled offers. Such underparticipation
provoked strong concerns, both in the United States Government and in the private
sector, since the U.S. objective in the talks was to seek secure commitments on
2. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Air Transport Services, para. 2, Uruguay
Round Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative
Action, and Required Supporting Statements, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1610 (1994).
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trade liberalization in this sector "from a wide range of commercially important
developed and developing countries. "
3
Six weeks later, the situation and outlook were not appreciably different. Only
eight more countries tabled either conditional offers or written statements of intent
to improve their Uruguay Round offers. An internal assessment by the WTO Com-
mittee on Trade in Financial Services in late April expressed alarm that failure in
the negotiations would be an unfortunate beginning for the WTO and a "significant
setback to creating a common set of rules for services. . . . The United States
again warned that it would not accept an MFN commitment unless key developing
countries made satisfactory offers. The administration reported to the Congress,
"It's up to them [key developing countries] whether we will have a successful nego-
tiation in financial services or not."
5
In late May, Director-General Ruggiero warned that failure in the financial
services talks would "be a setback both to the development of services trade and
to the multilateral system." 6 The United States finally tabled its offer, including
a proposal to provide MFN treatment. However, the United States would take
an MFN exemption if existing offers were not improved adequately and more
offers were not tabled satisfactorily.
By early June, U.S. financial services providers were sufficiently pessimistic
about the outcome of negotiations to urge the administration to develop a contin-
gency plan in case the talks failed. 7 The Coalition of Services Industries Financial
Services Group judged the current offers in the talks as simply inadequate, and
concluded that the United States would be worse off with any such agreement.8
Director-General Ruggiero pressed the United States not to withdraw its offer,
and some developing countries did improve their offers in June. For example,
all the ASEAN countries except Brunei made new offers.
The final negotiations were in Geneva the week-end of June 24-25. Treasury
and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) officials, Senate trade staff, and many
financial services industry representatives evaluated the latest new offers and
engaged in extensive bilateral negotiations. However, the yield was too little
from too few. As one headline captured the outcome, "U.S. Pulls Plug on WTO
Financial Services Talks, Takes MFN Exemption." 9
3. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 135(a), 19 U.S.C. § 3555(a).
4. Reported in "WTO Credibility at Stake in Financial Services Talks," Inside U.S. Trade 19
(May 5, 1995).
5. Id., quoting from a report on the WTO submitted pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, § 124, 19 U.S.C. § 3534.
6. "EU to Step up Pressure for Improvement in Financial Services Offers," Inside U.S. Trade
8 (May 26, 1995).
7. Financial Services Firms Urge Contingency Plan for Failure of WTO Talks," Inside U.S.
Trade 1 (June 9, 1995).
8. Id.
9. Inside U.S. Trade 1 (June 30, 1995).
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The U.S. MFN exemption does not apply to existing financial service invest-
ments in the United States, and the United States agreed to continue nondiscrimina-
tory treatment in this regard. However, the MFN exemption applies to all new in-
vestment or expansion of existing investments in the United States in the financial
services sectors, including banking, securities, insurance, and asset management.
The U.S. decision was widely denounced by trading partners as warmly as it
was praised by the U.S. financial service industry. In view of the U.S. decision,
most knowledgeable observers expected the talks simply to collapse, a setback
for the new WTO. However, the EU assumed leadership of an endeavor to save
the negotiations by salvaging the offers made by other Members, even without
U.S. participation. European Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan assumed the
role normally played by the U.S. Trade Representative and urged Members to
maintain their offers and conclude an interim agreement. Through considerable
urging, Sir Leon succeeded in achieving an interim financial services agreement
to which the United States has taken an MFN exemption regarding all new or
expanded investment in the U.S. financial service sectors.
This outcome may be viewed more or less favorably, depending on the perspec-
tive. In light of the U.S. invocation of an MFN exemption, the exercise of GATT
leadership by the EU reflects that agreements can be achieved even without the
support of both the United States and the EU, previously considered a necessary
(albeit not sufficient) condition for GATT success. Moreover, the parties reached
an agreement, if only on an interim basis, that is modestly trade liberalizing. On
the other hand, the U.S. MFN exemption may be perceived as a harmful precedent
for post-Uruguay Round efforts at further trade liberalization. The exemption
also was a signal that the United States is committed to achieving reciprocal trade
agreements that afford a balance of symmetrical rights and obligations.
In any event, the outcome of the first major WTO negotiation was less than
ideal.
C. SELECTION OF THE APPELLATE BODY
One of the most dramatic achievements of the Uruguay Round is the WTO
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
The Understanding incorporates procedural improvements to which the parties
tentatively agreed in April 1989 and also makes sweeping substantive improve-
ments as well by:
" establishing panels to examine disputes, as by providing standard terms of
reference;
* providing for virtually automatic adoption of panel reports, thereby eliminat-
ing the losing party's ability to block adoption of a report adverse to its
interests;
* providing for binding arbitration if parties disagree about the reasonable
period for the losing party's compliance with a panel's recommendations
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or the amount of compensation required (or retaliation authorized) in the
event of continued noncompliance;
" ensuring vigilant scrutiny by the Dispute Settlement Body of compliance
with panel reports; and
" providing a right of appeal for legal issues and establishing a new Appellate
Body for this purpose.
Although not generally as important as the virtually automatic adoption of
panel reports, the Appellate Body was a significant safeguard for sound panel
reports. In the event that a rogue or aberrational report were issued, Members
reasoned, the Appellate Body would serve as a check to restore a sensible interpre-
tation of the WTO Agreement.
The Appellate Body is comprised of seven persons appointed by the Dispute
Settlement Body for four-year terms. They are to be "persons of recognized
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally." Moreover, they must be "broadly
representative of membership in the WTO. " 0 The Understanding does not pro-
vide any more specific details about the selection of the appellate body.
Most trade experts believe that a relatively short list of persons best qualified
to serve on the Appellate Body could have been approved in Geneva by trade
experts in a matter of days, if not hours. Members then could have been called
upon to narrow such a short list of eminent persons to the requisite seven.
Instead, the selection process began quite differently, with many countries
championing candidates who, despite admirable r6sum6s, would not have been
on a short list of "persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise
in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements
generally." In short, the Appellate Body selections mirrored too closely and
more broadly the Director-General selection process, with the competition often
between politically chosen candidates. The key variable for selection among them
was not their qualifications, but essentially a quota system based on nationality.
The United States and the EU both insisted on two representatives on the
Appellate Body; the rest of the world argued that two of more than a hundred
members would hold four of only seven seats. The United States finally agreed
to the selection of only one of its two candidates, provided the EU agreed likewise
to one European candidate. The EU less graciously prolonged its insistence on two
European seats, but finally acquiesced, reluctantly. Even so, the EU specifically
reserved the right to urge a new manner of selection, yielding greater European
representation, in the future.
As a result of this selection process, many of the world's leading GATT/WTO
authorities-luminaries such as Professors John Jackson of the University of
Michigan, Robert Hudec of the University of Minnesota, and Kenneth W. Dam
10. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art. 17:1-3.
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of the University of Chicago-are not members of the Appellate Body. Perhaps
they were simply not interested in serving. However, the stature of the Appellate
Body would have been enhanced if the Appellate Body included more persons
of their widely recognized expertise.
Of course, the Appellate Body includes some world-renowned trade experts,
and may do an excellent job and increase its overall credibility through its perfor-
mance. WTO supporters worldwide certainly hope so. However, a less political,
less geographic, and more meritorious selection process would have launched
this new, important institution with perhaps more confidence.
D. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBERS
Finally, another major WTO activity throughout 1995 that continues in 1996
is the negotiations for the accession of several new members, including notably
the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Russia, and other republics of the former
Soviet Union. While the negotiation regarding China attracted far and away the
most attention, all are important. The collective result of these negotiations could
bring much of the earth's population within the WTO, thus enormously expanding
its reach, influence, and ability to promote trade with revenue- and job-creating
effects.
E. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the climax of the Uruguay Round achievement would necessarily and
inevitably be followed by a more hesitant, unsure period. In any event, 1995
was a year of modest accomplishment in the WTO, followed by preparations
for the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996.
III. Key Plurilateral Developments
by Claire E. Reade
NAFTA is clearly the most prominent plurilateral trade arrangement in which
the United States participates. In 1995, however, the United States also partici-
pated in several other trade initiatives, including APEC, a new Transatlantic
Agenda (Agenda) with the EU, and the effort to negotiate the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas. 1995 was a year in which these initiatives made
modest progress and NAFTA institutions gained considerable strength. At the
same time, NAFTA was under new strain in 1995 from politically sensitive,
issue-specific disagreements.
A. EUROPE: THE TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA AND THE TRANSATLANTIC
BUSINESS DIALOGUE
Experts on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed concern about weakening
U.S.-European trade and diplomatic cooperation. In an effort to combat this
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perception, in early December 1995, the United States and the EU announced
a comprehensive Transatlantic Agenda of issues on which they would intensify
their cooperative efforts.
The Agenda is impressively broad, covering a range of political and security
issues, from fostering Eastern European democracy to combatting international
drug trafficking. Trade and economic issues, such as support for the WTO, work
on a multilateral investment treaty, and cooperation in a joint trade study, also
are featured prominently. Finally, the Agenda also includes pledges of regulatory
harmonization, enhanced information flow, and technology cooperation.
The Agenda is in no sense a legally binding agreement, however. Many parts
of the Agenda speak in terms of political aims rather than actual commitments.
Thus, the parties typically commit themselves to work toward particular objec-
tives, without any firm time frame for accomplishing specific goals. Concrete
commitments are limited to technical efforts such as conclusion of a customs
cooperation agreement, development of an intellectual property seminar, and
agreement on certain product standards.
The engine to drive the United States and the EU aggressively toward enhancing
transatlantic trade and investment may well prove to be the U.S.-EU business
community. Transatlantic business groups responded enthusiastically to the U.S.
Commerce Secretary's invitation in mid-1995 to offer ideas on how to promote
U.S.-EU trade and investment. The groups put pressure on their governments
to take concrete action by issuing a report at a joint industry/government meeting
in Seville, Spain, in November 1995 expressing their strong views on which
issues were urgent and these issues needed to be resolved.
This Transatlantic Business Dialogue report covered four areas: standards and
regulatory issues, trade liberalization, investment problems, and third countries.
Excessive and inconsistent regulations were a prominent focus of criticism. The
report also recommended detailed modifications to international investment rules.
Most importantly, the business community asked for government responses to
their recommendations within six months.
While the governments stated that their December Agenda incorporated many
of the business community's recommendations, the Agenda's written commitment
to action was fairly weak. If the business community continues to press for more
aggressive government action, however, this pressure may motivate the EU and
the United States to act with more alacrity on at least some issues. If this scenario
plays out, a number of lingering nontariff barriers hampering trade and investment
between the United States and Europe could be eliminated within a period as
short as the next year or two.
B. ASIA: APEC
In November 1994, members of the APEC forum met in Bogor, Indonesia,
and agreed to a goal of free trade and investment for APEC-developed countries
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by 2010 and for APEC-developing countries by 2020. A year later, in Osaka,
Japan, APEC members were supposed to move from the mere expression of a
broad policy vision toward actual implementation of this goal. The 1995 Action
Agenda that eventually emerged from Osaka represents some political progress,
but did not contain the rigorous commitments the United States wanted to see.
The U.S. business community was quite concerned about the lax nature of
the APEC policy commitments in Bogor. For example, APEC statements on
liberalizing investment lacked the rigor and comprehensiveness of U.S. bilateral
investment treaties, making some members of the U.S. business community ques-
tion the utility of pursuing any negotiations in the APEC forum.
The Osaka meeting was intended to demonstrate that the APEC countries were
genuinely committed in principle, at least to liberalization of trade and investment.
Countries came to Osaka with symbolic unilateral downpayments of tariff cuts
and other liberalizing measures. Each country also adopted the Osaka Action
Agenda, "the embodiment of our political will to carry through our commitment
at Bogor.
' 12
The Action Agenda required that each country develop and implement a specific
individual plan for liberalizing trade and investment. The plans are to be in place
before the next APEC summit, which will be held in the Philippines in November
1996. Action plans will cover fifteen separate areas: tariffs, nontariff barriers,
services (with special emphasis on telecommunications, transportation, energy,
and tourism), investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, intel-
lectual property, competition law, government procurement, deregulation, rules
of origin, dispute mediation, mobility of business people, implementation of the
Uruguay Round agreements, and information gathering and analysis.
Just how aggressive and comprehensive these action plans will prove to be
remains unsure, since they are driven strictly by the political will of each country
and not by any binding commitments to the APEC group as a whole.
Indeed, an important conflict among APEC members at Osaka demonstrated
the highly political character of the APEC initiative and the lowest common
denominator approach to these negotiations. Some countries, notably Japan,
South Korea, China, and Taiwan, pressed for the right to make exceptions to
their liberalization commitments, particularly in the agricultural sector. The
United States and others strongly opposed this approach. Notwithstanding the
ostensibly clear commitment to free trade in Bogor a year earlier, the pronounce-
ments from Osaka finessed the issue.
Looking toward the future, it remains unclear exactly how far and how fast
11. APEC members include the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Mexico, and Papua New Guinea. (Countries interested in becoming members include
Russia and India.)
12. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), November 22, 1995.
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APEC liberalization will move. The United States did not succeed in shifting
the APEC initiative toward speedy development of a legally binding agreement,
so progress on tough issues is unlikely. However, important practical improve-
ments in certain technical areas, such as customs and visa procedures and product
standards, may still be possible in the near term; and these changes may modestly
decrease trade barriers in the APEC region over the next several years.
C. NAFTA
The second year of operation for NAFTA was 1995. The most prominent
news story concerning NAFTA during 1995 focused on the controversy over
whether the U.S. Executive Branch would be able to convince Congress to renew
so-called fast-track legislation to facilitate Chile's accession to NAFTA. 3 New
fast-track legislation never materialized; and, as a result, Chile's talks with the
United States on NAFTA accession remained at a technical level with no commit-
ments being made on either side. In the absence of fast track, Chile also has
held more intensive free trade talks with Canada as an interim step toward future
NAFTA accession.
While NAFTA developments unrelated to Chile received far less publicity,
several NAFTA institutions passed some fairly significant milestones in 1995.
The NAFTA parties faced several new challenges to NAFTA disciplines as well.
Important actions by NAFTA institutions included the following:
* Mexico accepted the adverse findings of the first NAFTA dispute settlement
panel it faced under Chapter 19, the NAFTA chapter that deals with anti-
dumping and countervailing duty measures.
* For the first time, the NAFTA Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(CEC) used Article 13 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation to study an environmental issue that could affect all three
NAFTA partners. The CEC investigated the mysterious death of thousands
of migratory birds in Mexico in 1994. The CEC publicly reported its conclu-
sions and recommendations to the NAFTA parties' environment chiefs in
October 1995, generating a commitment by Mexico to review the issue and
take necessary action.
" The CEC also clarified the meaning of the NAFTA environmental side
agreement by responding to a claim by U.S. environmental groups that the
United States was not enforcing the Endangered Species Act. The CEC
decided that a failure to enforce U.S. environmental laws could not be used
as a basis for striking down new legislation. Under the side agreement, each
NAFTA party has the right to modify its environmental laws and establish
13. "Fast track" authority enables the U.S. Executive Branch to present a trade agreement to
Congress for expedited approval on an up or down vote, without amendments being permitted. The
element is critical to Executive Branch negotiating authority.
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its environmental protection, the CEC noted. United State environmentalists
were very disappointed, but the CEC action may mute conservative U.S.
politicians' claims that the CEC will try to interfere with U.S. sovereignty
by imposing its standards on the United States.
" In September 1995, the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission,
established under the NAFTA environment side agreement to clean up the
border between the United States and Mexico, approved a first set of infra-
structure projects.
* The U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO), established under the
NAFTA labor side agreement, issued its first report, finding that Mexico was
likely not enforcing its labor laws. The report found that Mexico permitted
managers at a Sony plant to fire certain workers for legally organizing a
union. This report, together with earlier U.S. National Administrative Office
investigations, led to a series of public meetings to discuss union registration.
* The Mexican National Administrative Office concluded that U.S. labor laws
likely were not being enforced in California, where a Sprint subsidiary closed
down just a week before a scheduled union election. The United States and
Mexico agreed to a series of actions in response to these findings, including
a public meeting in the United States.
* The NAFTA's Commission on Labor Cooperation officially opened its doors
and began two studies. The first study concerns labor laws and enforcement
mechanisms in the three countries. The second study will compare various
statistics on the NAFTA countries' labor forces. The Commission will also
develop a labor dispute avoidance procedure that will use independent panels
of experts to examine issues of common concern to the NAFTA parties.
The year 1995 was not simply a year of NAFTA institutional development,
however. Several difficult disputes arose throughout the year, and leaders re-
solved none of these issues by year end.
One important dispute arose when Canada converted a number of agricultural
quotas to tariff rate quotas (TRQs) to meet its WTO obligations, and then claimed
it did not have to eliminate them despite its NAFTA obligation to the United
States to eliminate all tariff measures. Canada has long been worried that a flood
of U.S. imports would destroy certain agricultural industries (particularly in the
politically sensitive province of Quebec), and argued that its TRQs were an
exception to normal NAFTA rules.
The United States disagreed and instituted dispute resolution proceedings under
NAFTA Chapter 20. The political sensitivities surrounding this issue could put
some strain on NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement if the United States prevails,
since political pressures within Canada may make compliance difficult.
Other significant Chapter 20 disputes during 1995 involved the United States
and Mexico. In April 1995, the United States requested consultations under Chap-
ter 20 concerning alleged Mexican discrimination against U.S. package delivery
services operating in Mexico. Mexico argued that its complex trucking regulations
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precluded quick and easy amendment to correct the apparent discrimination.
However, Mexico may be protecting its trucking industry from U.S. competi-
tion. 14 United States pressure did not produce any solution to the problem by the
end of 1995.
United States political concerns apparently have driven two other Chapter 20
disputes. First, in December 1995, the United States Secretary of Transportation
announced that United States would not meet a NAFTA deadline for authorizing
Mexican trucks to haul loads into U.S. border states. The United States cited
safety concerns and drug trafficking, issues that could create a backlash against
the Clinton administration's support for NAFTA during an election year. Further-
more, U.S. trucking unions pressed the U.S. administration to prevent Mexican
trucks from moving further into the United States. While many Republicans
decried this NAFTA violation and the Mexicans quickly asked for consultations
under Chapter 20, the U.S. administration has not moved. Given the upcoming
U.S. elections, this issue could prove difficult to resolve in the short term.
The second set of Chapter 20 consultations initiated by Mexico arose from
measures proposed by the United States to try to stem the flow of winter tomatoes
into the United States from Mexico. Winter season tomato growers failed in their
attempt to use the U.S. safeguard statute, section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974,
to cut back Mexican imports. USTR responded to the political pressure from
Florida interests in December 1995 with a proposal to change the calculation of
TRQs for Mexican tomatoes so import flows would be more restricted.
Mexico charged that this restriction would violate NAFTA and requested Chap-
ter 20 consultations. The issue remained unresolved through February 1996,
although the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture stated that he would not take any
steps in violation of NAFTA. 15 Nonetheless, the political pressure on the United
States to solve the Florida industry's problem in this election year appears likely
to lead to import restrictions, whether accepted by the Mexican industry or im-
posed by the United States.
Overall, NAFTA has worked fairly well thus far to channel many disputes into
manageable legal channels. However, whether NAFTA disciplines can handle the
most sensitive political issues that arise between NAFTA partners remains to be
seen.
D. THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
In December 1994, Canada, the United States, and nations from Latin America
and the Caribbean participated in the Summit of the Americas at which they
14. See Inside U.S. Trade, April 28, 1995, at 7.
15. Inside U.S. Trade, January 19, 1996, at 1.
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agreed to conclude negotiations on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
by 2005.
Although the United States initially hoped that the FTAA negotiation process
would entail early trade liberalization beyond WTO commitments as well as
aggressive consideration of labor and environmental issues, the Latin American
and Caribbean nations quickly dampened these ambitions. Concerns about finan-
cial instability in the region, the distractions of MERCOSUR negotiations, and
the limited capacity of the United States to accelerate trade liberalization in areas
of interest to other countries ensured that the construction of an FTAA would
not take off at lightning speed during 1995.
Instead, at a ministerial meeting in Denver in June 1995, FTAA participants
agreed to proceed in a deliberate fashion. They developed a framework for high
level political decision making on how to proceed with further negotiations, and
they set up seven technical working groups to provide an information base for
these negotiations. The groups were to deal with the following areas: smaller
economies, investment issues, antidumping and subsidies matters, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, standards and technical barriers to trade, market access,
and customs procedures, and rules of origin.
The Denver Declaration outlined a specific mandate for each working group
to complete by the March 1996 ministerial meeting in Cartagena, Colombia. The
tasks set out for the groups focused primarily on gathering of information and
development of recommendations on how negotiations in a given area could
proceed during 1996 and beyond. The mandate asked only a few working groups
to take actual steps toward trade liberalization.
Given the variable resources available to individual countries and the many
issues for group consideration, many of the groups had difficulty meeting all of
their objectives. However, information on the many facets of hemispheric trade
has been accumulating. Indeed, a vice ministerial group that met in December
agreed to set up four additional working groups at the March 1996 ministerial
meeting. These groups will deal with intellectual property rights, competition
issues, services decisions, and government procurement.
Political leaders also have been sending consistent messages about the scope
and level of commitment likely in an FTAA. Public statements by regional leaders
indicate the FTAA will liberalize trade beyond WTO commitments and should
incorporate most of the subject areas covered by NAFTA.
Nonetheless, significant open issues remain. On the issues of substance, smaller
countries in the region have been pressing for special and differential treatment,
an initiative strongly resisted by Canada and the United States. As for process,
no one seems to have a sense of how to actually negotiate this kind of broad
agreement with thirty-four diverse participants, particularly when existing re-
gional arrangements create very different trade conditions among the parties.
Finally, the lack of U.S. fast-track authority and the MERCOSUR countries'
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preoccupation with other more economically beneficial trade arrangements reduce
any sense of urgency in the negotiations. While certain elements necessary to
any FTAA negotiation may be coming together, an actual FTAA seems a distant
goal.
IV. Key Bilateral Developments
by Janet A. Nuzum
A. INTRODUCTION
The bilateral trade agenda in 1995 included both issues from previous years
as well as new disputes. Last year marked the ten-year anniversary of the first
free trade agreement entered into by the United States-that with Israel. The
U.S. list of free trade agreement partners would not expand in 1995, however,
to include Chile. In the absence of fast-track negotiating authority, U.S. discus-
sions with Chile on possible NAFTA accession focused only on technical and
preparatory matters.
Most of the developments on the bilateral trade agenda came about in connection
with, if not as a direct result of, the institution of a U.S. investigation under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The most notable achievements were the
successful conclusion in February of an agreement with China on intellectual
property and an agreement in June with Japan on autos and auto parts. No sooner
did the dispute with Japan on autos and auto parts end, however, than a new
dispute over the Japanese market for photographic film and paper began. The
United States reached four bilateral agreements with Korea in 1995, covering
telecommunications, meats, steel, and autos.
Bilateral trade disputes with our largest trading partner, Canada, focused again
on agriculture and cultural industries. A dispute over discriminatory practices
in the granting of cable television broadcasting licenses appeared to dissipate
when the private parties reached a joint commercial agreement. A one-year
agreement on U.S.-Canadian wheat trade expired, although underlying concerns
about both Canadian and U.S. practices in this sector continue. Bilateral consulta-
tions on lumber trade continued throughout the year. Finally, a dispute over
EU policies on banana imports carried over from 1994 and led to procedural
developments on both the bilateral and multilateral fronts by year-end 1995.
B. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
January 1, 1995, marked the full implementation of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Area Agreement.' 6 This first free trade area agreement for the United States
16. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Israel, signed April 22, 1985, entered into force
August 19, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985); implemented in U.S. Law by Pub. L. No.
99-47, approved June 11, 1985, 19 U.S.C. § 2112.
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became effective on August 19, 1985. The scope of the agreement included tariff
barrier elimination over a ten-year period as well as nontariff barrier reduction
between the two countries in areas such as licenses, procurement, and subsidies.
The U.S. -Israel FTA covered trade issues beyond the scope of GATT and served
as a model for future free trade agreements. As a consequence of the U.S. -Israel
FTA, the share of U.S. exports to Israel enjoying duty-free access increased
from 18 percent in 1982 to 100 percent in 1995.
The main purpose of the U.S.-Israel FTA was to expand trade between the
two countries; and indeed, trade more than doubled during the ten-year phase-in
period. United States exports to Israel grew from $1.8 billion in 1985 to $5.6
billion in 1995." Similarly, U.S. imports from Israel grew from $2.1 billion to
$5.7 billion during this period. Israel ranked as our twenty-third largest trading
partner last year.
C. UNITED STATES-CHINA AGREEMENT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Although the United States and China reached an agreement on intellectual
property rights protection in 1992, that agreement focused on improving China's
statutory and regulatory regime for the protection of intellectual property rights.
United States concerns subsequently shifted to the lack of adequate intellectual
property rights enforcement measures by the Chinese Government. Piracy of
U.S. sound recordings, motion pictures, and computer software, for example,
was very extensive and went largely undisciplined in China. On July 1, 1994,
these concerns led USTR to name China a priority foreign country under the
special 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
and to initiate a section 301 investigation.18 The U.S. sound recording, motion
picture, and computer software industries actively developed the U.S. case and
pressed for meaningful action by the Chinese authorities. Bilateral consultations
failed to resolve U.S. concerns by year-end 1994, prompting USTR Kantor to
announce that retaliatory duties of 100 percent on certain products from China
would go into effect February 26, 1995, absent a satisfactory agreement.' 9 Ana-
lysts valued the proposed sanctions at $1.08 billion. China threatened counterre-
taliation if the U.S. sanctions went into effect.
17. Trade figures used throughout this article are developed by the staff of the U.S. International
Trade Commission based on official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce. To be consistent
with the approach used by the Department of Commerce in its monthly release of trade statistics,
U.S. export figures include total (domestic plus foreign) exports; U.S. import figures are general
imports, customs basis; two-way trade figures are exports plus imports.
18. Identification of Priority Foreign Country and Initiation of Section 302 Investigation, 59
Fed. Reg. 35,558 (1994). USTR initiated this investigation under the so-called Special 301 provision
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1303, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2242.
19. Determination of Action Concerning the People's Republic of China's Protection of Intellec-
tual Property and Provision of Market Access to Persons Who Rely on Intellectual Property, 60
Fed. Reg. 7230 (1995).
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The dispute was highly visible and each side was reluctant to be perceived as
giving in to the other. During the early morning hours of February 26, however,
the parties reached an agreement, averting retaliation under the section 301 pro-
ceeding. Under the agreement, China agreed to establish effective intellectual
property rights enforcement and to reduce current intellectual property rights
piracy, particularly of copyrighted works. China also agreed to improve access
to the Chinese market for U.S. audiovisual products, computer software, and
books and periodicals. The new enforcement structures included working groups
at the central, provincial, and local levels; high-level government task forces;
urban strike forces; and special enforcement periods of intensified crackdowns.
China also pledged increased resources to stop Chinese export of pirated products
and agreed to establish an effective border control system, with technical assis-
tance from the United States.
In addition to stepped up enforcement measures, the bilateral agreement in-
cluded market access commitments. For the first time, China agreed to permit
U.S. companies to establish joint ventures to produce, reproduce, distribute, sell,
and perform audiovisual works in China. United States motion picture companies
may enter into revenue-sharing arrangements with partners in China.
As the negotiations were coming to a close, the seriousness of China's commit-
ments was symbolically demonstrated by the raiding and closure of seven factories
producing pirated music compact discs and movie laser discs. Under the terms
of the agreement, China will share information on its enforcement activities on
a quarterly basis, and bilateral consultations will occur every six months.
By late 1995, however, U.S. concerns were rising over the adequacy of imple-
mentation in several areas. For example, although China significantly reduced
piracy of compact discs, videos, and books at the retail level, numerous factories
producing pirated CDs were still operating. Large exports of infringing products
suggested that Chinese customs authorities were not aggressively pursuing in-
fringers. Regulations providing Chinese customs officials with enhanced enforce-
ment powers contained significant loopholes that shifted much of the enforcement
burden to the intellectual property rightholder. Although the 1995 intellectual
property rights agreement was a significant achievement, implementation issues
clearly linger.
D. UNITED STATES-JAPAN AUTO AND AUTO PARTS AGREEMENT
United States trade with Japan, our second-largest trading partner, exceeded
$187 billion in 1995, with U.S. exports to Japan of $64 billion and imports from
Japan of almost $124 billion. As usual, access to Japan's market in general,
and autos in particular, dominated the bilateral trade agenda. The U.S.-Japan
framework talks, initiated in July 1993, expired in July 1995, but mutual
agreements extended the negotiations. During the year, many bilateral consulta-
tions reviewed and assessed progress under various framework agreements,
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including those on construction, insurance, paper, and deregulation. In Novem-
ber, the United States Government submitted its third deregulation proposal to
Japan, focusing on deregulation in twelve specific industry sectors. 20 In Decem-
ber, the Japanese Deregulation Subcommittee of the Administrative Reform
Council released a deregulation package that recommended a range of actions
to improve deregulation in Japan.
In June, while attending the G-7 economic summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia,
President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Murayama announced an exten-
sion of the framework talks and the signing of a U.S.-Japan investment
agreement.21 President Clinton also took the occasion to rule out any extension
of the auto talks and reiterated his intention to take retaliatory action against
imports of Japanese autos if an acceptable agreement were not concluded by June
28.
Auto trade with Japan has long been a contentious subject. The Clinton adminis-
tration has pursued bilateral discussions on the automotive sector since October
1993. On October 1, 1994, USTR initiated a section 301 investigation on autos
and auto parts focusing on three areas: deregulation of the replacement parts
market in Japan, increased access for U.S. automakers to Japanese dealership
networks, and increased purchases by Japanese automakers of U.S. auto parts.22
As expected, negotiations with the Japanese Government were not easy; and
before the parties reached an agreement, the United States Government made
very clear its intention to take retaliatory action if necessary. The retaliatory
action taken under section 301 would be 100 percent duties on thirteen models
of Japanese luxury cars. 3
Although negotiations went, as usual, right up to the deadline, USTR Kantor
and Japanese Trade Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced an agreement on
U.S. -Japan auto trade on June 29. The agreement included all three areas sought
by the United States and objective criteria for monitoring progress in these areas.
The Japanese Government pledged to take various steps to deregulate the Japanese
market for replacement auto parts, including reform of the qualifications for
designated or certified garages and reform and review of the critical parts designa-
tions. To facilitate Japanese dealerships' access to U.S. automobiles, the Japanese
Government would reassure Japanese dealers of their right to sell foreign vehicles
and to be free of pressure not to do so from Japanese auto manufacturers. The
20. Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding
Deregulation, Administrative Reform and Competition Policy in Japan (Nov. 1995).
21. The agreement underwent additional textual review, and was concluded with an exchange
of letters between the two governments on July 20, 1995.
22. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Comment: Barriers to Access to the
Auto Parts Replacement Market in Japan, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,034 (1994).
23. Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determina-
tion of Action Pursuant to Section 301; Barriers to Access to the Auto Parts Replacement Market
in Japan, 60 Fed. Reg. 26,745 (1995).
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Japanese Government also pledged to increase the budget and strengthen the
activities of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission.
In addition, the five largest Japanese auto manufacturers announced plans to
increase U.S. and foreign parts purchases in the United States and in Japan and
to increase parts and vehicle production in the United States. The Big Three U.S.
auto manufacturers indicated their expectation to increase exports of competitive
products to Japan from 45,000 in 1994 to 160,000 in 1998. Although the actions
to be taken by the Japanese private sector were critical to the successful conclusion
of the negotiations, these elements of the agreement were not government commit-
ments. They were instead voluntary plans by the companies, not strictly enforce-
able under section 301 of the Trade Act.
Recognizing that enforceability would be a crucial factor in the agreement's
ultimate success or failure, USTR insisted that specific provisions for monitoring
progress be part of the agreement itself. The agreement included seventeen objec-
tive criteria, both qualitative and quantitative, for assessing progress. For exam-
ple, two of these criteria dealt with changes in the number of new foreign vehicles
sold in Japan and changes in the purchases of U.S. auto parts for use in Japanese
automobiles produced in the United States. The United States Government also
pledged to work with the auto parts industry to develop a new data collection
and verification system as part of the monitoring effort. Semiannual progress
reports will be published by the administration.
No sooner did the negotiations end than arguments over differing interpretations
of the commitments began. Debate over the nuances of voluntary plans, targets,
goals, and the objective criteria ensued, with all sides putting their own spin on
the character of the commitments. Although the agreement itself was a substantial
accomplishment, bilateral disputes are likely to continue in coming years over
its implementation and interpretation.
E. JAPANESE MARKET FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM AND PAPER
On July 3, less than a week after the resolution of the longstanding auto parts
dispute, USTR announced the initiation of a section 301 investigation based on
Eastman Kodak's complaint of anticompetitive practices in the Japanese market
for consumer photographic film and paper. Kodak alleged that blocked distribu-
tion channels in Japan denied Kodak fair access to Japanese consumers through
exclusive distribution relationships, anticompetitive practices on retail price main-
tenance, financial dependence of distributors on Japanese manufacturers, and
nontransparent and anticompetitive rebates from manufacturers. Kodak directed
the allegations at Fuji Photo Film, Ltd., Japan's film distributors, and the Japanese
Government.
Fuji vehemently denied the allegations, and the government of Japan said it
would not negotiate with USTR under the threat of trade sanctions. As 1995
came to an end, the Japanese Government tried to divert the dispute into a larger
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forum and proposed putting the subject on the agenda of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Trade Committee. The United States
Government declined.
In early 1996, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission announced that it would
conduct a year-long survey of competition in the Japanese photographic film
and paper markets. Kodak found the Japanese Fair Trade Commission's survey
proposal inadequate. Although the dispute touches on the interesting intersection
of competition policy and market access, little progress developed in the absence
of serious bilateral discussions.
F. UNITED STATES-CANADA TRADE RELATIONS
Canada continued to be our largest trading partner, with two-way trade in
1995 reaching over $271 billion. Last year, Canada accounted for 22 percent of
U.S. exports and almost 20 percent of U.S. imports. Although most of this
trade was without incident, several disputes with Canada arose last year in the
ever-sensitive areas of agriculture, lumber, and cultural industries.
The United States-Canada Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Grains,
which provided for a one-year TRQ on U.S. imports of Canadian wheat, expired
on September 11, 1995. The United States and Canada negotiated the MOU in
1994 in lieu of unilateral U.S. action against Canadian wheat under section 22.24
Upon expiration of the Grains MOU, however, USTR Mickey Kantor and U.S.
Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman announced that the United States would
continue to monitor imports of Canadian wheat using the MOU's TRQ levels
as a benchmark. The United States could request consultations with Canada after
six, nine, or eleven months if actual wheat imports from Canada exceeded the
levels applicable under the TRQ. The parties would also monitor barley imports.
United States officials vowed to use appropriate U.S. trade laws in the event of
market disruption from Canadian wheat. On the Canadian side, Canadian officials
welcomed the expiration of the MOU, noting that, as a result of the Uruguay
Round, international legal obligations now preclude U.S. authorities from using
section 22 against Canadian wheat.
The 1994 settlement of the United States-Canada wheat dispute also established
a Joint Commission on Grains. The Commission included six U.S. members
with growing, milling, and farming backgrounds, and six Canadian members
with teaching, trading, pooling, and malting backgrounds. The Joint Commission
issued a final report at the end of the year. The final report contained fourteen
recommendations on issues ranging from policy coordination and cross-border
trade to grading schemes and regulatory regimes.
Bilateral discussions on softwood lumber trade also continued in 1995, although
in a less confrontational manner than in previous years. In December 1994, the
24. See 7 U.S.C. § 5624; Proclamation No. 6740, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,399 (1994).
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United States and Canada established a consultative mechanism to consider a
broad range of issues affecting trade in lumber, including subsidy practices,
forestry resource management policies, and other challenges facing the industry.
This bilateral mechanism's purpose was to shift the forum for dispute resolution
away from the more litigious arena of U.S. trade remedy laws to a more coopera-
tive, mutually beneficial process. Both sides exchanged views and considered
proposals on a number of issues during 1995 but did not reach any mutual
agreements by year's end.
Agriculture and lumber were not the only issues addressed by the United
States-Canada agenda. On February 6, 1995, USTR initiated a section 302 investi-
gation of the Canadian Government's transfer of a broadcasting license from a
U.S.-owned company to a Canadian-owned company.25 The 302 petition, filed
by Country Music Television (CMT) and its owner, Westinghouse Broadcasting
Company, argued that the Canadian action was an unreasonable barrier to U.S.
market access in Canada as well as a violation of Canadian obligations under
NAFTA's investment and services provisions. The petition sought restoration
of CMT's license, compensation for the company's losses, and adoption of new
policies to ensure that similar actions by Canada would not occur in the future.
The Canadian Government defended the Canadian Radio-Television and Tele-
communications Commission (CRTC), arguing that services in cultural industries
are exempt from coverage under NAFTA and that the CRTC decision was in
accordance with Canadian law as upheld by a Canadian court. The USTR asked
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to identify pending license appli-
cations from Canadian-owned entities and international facilities connected with
Canadian-owned entities. The USTR wanted the information to identify potential
targets for retaliation, and this request signaled USTR's interest in taking retalia-
tory action in the same sector.
In June, however, the USTR suspended the 302 investigation because the
owners of CMT and of Canada's New Country Music reached a tentative
agreement. The two sides agreed to form a single, twenty-four-hour country
music television network in which CMT would hold a 20 percent equity interest.
USTR nevertheless made clear its continuing concern over Canada's policy of
displacing foreign broadcasters in favor of Canadian broadcasters. As of year-end,
the private agreement was not final.
Another cultural dispute with Canada last year focused on a Canadian legislative
proposal to impose an 80 percent excise tax on advertising revenues of Canadian
split-run editions of foreign magazines. "Split-run" foreign magazines are maga-
zines that are written abroad but published in Canada with Canadian-directed
advertising. Advocates of the excise tax argued that the tax was necessary to
protect Canadian culture. The United States objected to the Canadian legislation,
25. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation Concerning Certain Discriminatory Canadian Commu-
nications Practices, 60 Fed. Reg. 8101 (1995).
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which the Parliament nevertheless passed in late 1995-early 1996. USTR Kantor
claimed the tax violated Canada's international obligations and that he was consid-
ering further action.
G. EU BANANA POLICIES
The dispute over EU policies to regulate banana imports continued in 1995
without resolution. In September 1994, Chiquita and the Hawaii Banana Industry
Association filed a section 301 petition challenging both the EU regime setting
TRQs on banana imports and a 1994 banana framework agreement between the
EU and four Latin American nations (Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela). Chiquita claimed these schemes disadvantaged U.S. companies that
market and distribute bananas. In October 1994, USTR initiated a section 301
investigation of the EU import regime, but deferred any action on the framework
agreement until the agreement's implementation.26
On January 9, 1995, following implementation of the framework agreement
by Colombia and Costa Rica, USTR initiated two investigations under section
301 of the policies and practices of Colombia and Costa Rica regarding exportation
of bananas to the EU.27 One year later, on January 10, 1996, USTR Kantor
determined the banana export policies, including export licensing requirements,
to be unfair, but indicated that no sanctions would be invoked at that time in
light of two MOUs reached with Costa Rica (on January 6) and Colombia (on
January 9).28 The MOUs established consultative mechanisms with Costa Rica
and Colombia designed to increase international cooperation on banana trade.
In particular, the two countries pledged to eliminate discrimination in the export
certificate system and to join the United States in pressing the EU for reform of
the EU import regime.
In October 1995, USTR terminated the earlier 301 investigation against the
EU banana import regime, and then initiated a second investigation to take the
dispute to the WTO. 29 Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and Ecuador joined the
United States in the WTO complaint.
26. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation Concerning the European Community Banana Import
Regime and Request for Public Comment, 59 Fed. Reg. 53,495 (1994).
27. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation Regarding Policies and Practices of the Government
of Colombia Concerning the Exportation of Bananas to the European Union; Request for Public
Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 3283 (1995); Initiation of Section 302 Investigation Regarding Policies and
Practices of the Government of Costa Rica Concerning the Exportation of Bananas to the European
Union; Request for Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1995).
28. The two MOUs were part of USTR's section 304 determinations on Colombia and Costa
Rica's policies and practices concerning the exportation of bananas to the European Union. See 61
Fed. Reg. 1788, 1789 (1996).
29. Termination of Investigation; Initiation of New Investigation and Request for Public Com-
ment: European Union Banana Regime, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,026 (1995).
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H. UNITED STATES-KOREA AGREEMENTS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, FOOD,
STEEL, AND AUTOS
Two-way trade with Korea, our seventh largest trading partner, reached almost
$50 billion in 1995. Disputes in four areas-telecommunications procurement,
food shelf-life standards, steel pipe and tube, and automobiles-led to bilateral
agreements with Korea last year.
The United States and Korea reached a telecommunications agreement with
Korea on March 27, 1995, in response to U.S. complaints that Korea was failing
to live up to its commitments under a 1992 bilateral agreement. United States
firms, including AT&T, charged that Korea was delaying certification of U.S.
products, including a new version of switching equipment, through lengthy and
unnecessary equipment tests. Korea agreed to provide nondiscriminatory procure-
ment and to exempt telecommunications equipment from type approval if the
equipment does not harm the Korean public network. The agreement established
an experts group to consider mutual recognition of equipment approval and to
develop criteria for determining when type approval is unnecessary. USTR esti-
mated the increased market access for U.S. firms to be valued at $100 million.
A U.S.-Korea dispute over trade in meat and other food products also led to
a bilateral agreement in 1995. In November 1994, USTR initiated a section 301
investigation in response to a petition filed by the National Pork Producers Coun-
cil, the American Meat Institute, and the National Cattlemen's Association.3 °
The petition challenged Korea's requirements for sausage distribution; limitations
on beef shelf-life; delays in inspection periods; and exclusion of U.S. bidders
from a contract tender process. In May 1995, the United States invoked WTO
dispute settlement; and on July 20, the two countries reached a bilateral agreement
resolving the dispute.
Under the terms of the agreement, Korea will phase out its system of shelf-
life requirements and allow manufacturers to set their own use-by dates. The
new rules would apply to chilled, vacuum-packed pork and beef and all frozen
food as of July 1, 1996, and to dried, packaged, canned, or bottled products
as of October 1, 1996. Interim steps based on internationally accepted shelf-life
standards would allow trade to resume during the transition period. Korea
further agreed to provide adequate time for U.S. pork producers to respond
to tender offers. The United States and Korea registered the agreement with
the WTO to strengthen its enforceability.
Only one week prior to the agreement on food shelf-life standards, the United
States reached a bilateral agreement with Korea on steel trade. A 301 petition
filed by the Committee on Pipe and Tube Imports complained of unfair advantages
to Korean pipe and tube producers as a result of price controls in the steel sector.
30. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: Korean Agricultural
Market Access Restrictions, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,006 (1994).
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On July 14, the United States and Korea announced an agreement establishing
a consultative mechanism to share data on steel sheet and pipe and tube products
and to review economic trends in the sector. Korea also agreed to notify the
United States in advance of any government action to control steel production,
pricing, or exports.
The bilateral agreements on food and steel trade may have resolved pending
trade disputes in time for the state visit of Korean President Kim Young Sam
on July 26-27, but did not resolve all trade disputes for the year. United States
concerns over market access to the Korean auto market led to the signing of an
MOU between the two countries on September 28, 1995.31 The MOU included
reductions in Korean auto taxes, changes to Korea's auto inspection standards,
and changes in Korea's exclusionary advertising rules. As a result of the MOU,
U.S. auto manufacturers will have substantially greater opportunities for self-
certification under revised safety standards and will face reduced documentation
burdens. The deal did not satisfy all of the U.S. auto industry's concerns, but
did save Korea from being named a priority country on the Super 301 list.
32
I. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding foreign criticism of section 301 as U.S. unilateralism, the
record in 1995 showed section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act to be an effective tool
for bilateral resolution of several trade disputes. Important agreements resolved
disputes with China, Japan, and Korea in areas involving large volumes of trade
during 1995. Implementation and enforcement of these and other bilateral
agreements are certain to be areas of attention in 1996.
V. Key Unilateral Developments
by G. Hamilton Loeb
When it comes to unilateral trade developments from the Clinton administra-
tion's perspective, 1995 probably best can be described as the morning after.
From the Republican point of view, their first year in control of Congress brought
to mind, with respect to trade, the famous phrase by William Shakespeare, "[F]ull
of sound and fury, Signifying nothing." 33 After two years in which the NAFTA
and WTO debates engulfed the Congress and the U.S. trade community, and
faced with a legislature controlled by the opposition and increasingly focused on
domestic issues, President Clinton's trade aides decided in 1995 to take a breather.
The few areas in which the Administration manifested a desire to reach
agreement-such as renewal of fast-track-proved unachievable. The Republican
31. U.S.-Korea Memorandum of Understanding: Market Access for Foreign Automobiles, signed
Sept. 28, 1995.
32. See Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994).
33. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act V. sc. v, verse 17.
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leadership, preoccupied with the budget stalemate and fearful of internal dissen-
sion, also accomplished little on the trade front. As a result, most of the year's
activity took place in the bilateral or multilateral arenas. Unilaterally, the notable
developments occurred through executive order, regulatory action, or court deci-
sion.
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
One of the key planks of the House Republicans' Contract with America during
the 1994 campaign was a promise to reduce the size of the federal government.
Soon after arriving in Washington in January 1995, congressional leaders in both
chambers settled on abolishing the Commerce Department (Commerce) as a first,
dramatic step toward fulfillment of that pledge.
Republicans offered a number of different proposals. Some would have merged
the bulk of Commerce's functions with the USTR in a new, independent Depart-
ment of Trade or U.S. Trade Agency. Others would have transferred pieces of
Commerce's responsibility to other agencies-export control to State or Defense,
dumping and countervailing duty cases to USTR-and would have abolished
others. Some Republicans sought to insert Commerce-dismantling provisions into
the continuing resolutions during the budget debate or into debt relief legislation,
but no bill passed with such provisions. In the face of determined opposition by
the Clinton administration and congressional Democrats, and with many key
Republicans in the Senate concerned about how Commerce's trade promotion
and regulation activities would be carried out in other agencies, attempts to kill
the Department faltered late in the year.
Other key trade initiatives met with no kinder a fate in 1995. Attempts to
renew the Generalized System of Preferences, achieve parity of the Caribbean
Basin Initiative nations with NAFTA, pass the Fair Trade in Financial Services
legislation (which would increase the federal government's ability to retaliate
against foreign financial services providers for unfair trade practices), ease restric-
tions on foreign ownership of telecommunications in the United States, and over-
haul the Export Administration Act all fell victim to a combination of partisan
wrangling, preoccupation with the budget dispute, or opposition from the growing
congressional bloc of trade liberalization skeptics.
Despite efforts by both the Clinton administration and Republican congres-
sional leaders, agreement on renewal of fast-track authority for trade negotiations
also proved elusive in 1995. The administration's insistence on sufficient flexibil-
ity to negotiate labor and environmental provisions as part of trade agreements
was anathema to those Republicans otherwise supportive of fast track. The lack
of fast-track authority hampered the administration's ability to conduct meaning-
ful trade negotiations, particularly the much-anticipated talks with Chile concern-
ing its possible accession to the NAFTA.
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B. MONITORING OF TRADE AGREEMENTS
The inability to negotiate new trade agreements likely caused administration
policymakers little worry, as the focus of trade policy shifted in any event. Rather
than concluding more bilateral or multilateral trade agreements, U.S. officials
began stressing the importance of monitoring the agreements already in place.
To further that goal, both the USTR and the Commerce Department announced
the formation of new units to monitor and enforce compliance with those
agreements by U.S. trading partners. After an initial jurisdictional spat between
the two agencies over the respective roles of the new units, a proposed modus
operandi seemed to develop. The USTR's monitoring and enforcement unit,
staffed by six USTR attorneys led by Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for
Monitoring and Enforcement Jane Bradley, will focus on preparation of the annual
National Trade Estimate Report, pursuit of multilateral and bilateral dispute settle-
ment efforts, and involvement in section 301 investigations. Commerce's Trade
Compliance Center, located within the International Trade Administration, will
function predominantly as a repository of information and will offer technical
and analytical expertise that USTR does not maintain in-house. Both agencies
pledged to cooperate closely, and President Clinton's nominee to head the Interna-
tional Trade Administration, Stuart Eizenstat, offered several public gestures of
reassurance in that respect.
Whether this new enforcement focus presages a longer-term shift in the U.S.
approach toward trade relations, or merely a pause in the rapid development of
international trade law through new trade agreements, will become clear only
in the years ahead.
C. EXPORT CONTROLS
At the beginning of 1995, the Republican trade leadership on the Hill called
revision of the 15-year-old Export Administration Act a top priority. Despite
that commitment, completion of a bill reforming the law eluded the Congress,
and the administration continued to exercise export control powers only by virtue
of extension of the presidentially declared emergency under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act.34
The administration's long-awaited overhaul of the Export Administration Reg-
ulations, by contrast, drew closer to completion in 1995, with the release of
proposed rules in May.35 The rules ease the burdens imposed on exporters and
align the classification system for items on the Commerce Control List with the
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
35. 60 Fed. Reg. 25,268 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. Part 730 and several sections thereafter)
(Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); 60 Fed. Reg. 25,480 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. Part 799)
(Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
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categories used in the EU. The most striking proposed change in the regulations
reflects a fundamental shift in approach: the proposed regulations reverse the
traditional presumption that prohibits all exports unless the exporter has obtained
a general or validated license for the transaction. Instead, no export license will
be necessary unless the new regulations affirmatively require it.
Toward the end of 1995, President Clinton took another step designed to
facilitate exports by signing an executive order establishing firm timetables for
interagency review of export license applications.3 6 The order allows the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, and Energy, along with the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, to review any license application received by the Department
of Commerce, but establishes specified procedures and deadlines for reaching
agreement among the agencies on a disputed application. The agencies must
resolve their disagreements within ninety days of the application's submission
or forward the application to the president for determination.
The most prominent export control issue of 1995 was encryption capabilities.
In response to enormous pressure from the software industry, the Clinton adminis-
tration re-examined its controls on the export of encryption software. Industry
lobbyists vehemently argue that the current restrictions impede their ability to
compete in the world marketplace. The initial administration proposal, to permit
exports of certain dual-key systems if a certified third party retains control of a
duplicate key in escrow, met with industry derision.37 Stung by the criticism,
the administration dropped the escrow requirement but retained firm ceilings on
key lengths. Industry spokespersons indicate that they will present a counter-
proposal sometime in the early part of this year.
The administration also eased controls on the sale of high-powered computers
abroad, raising the limits on the types of computers that manufacturers may
export while retaining restrictions on sales to certain designated countries.38
D. TRADE SANCTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS
The year 1995 also witnessed significant changes in the regulatory status of
several foreign nations:
" The United States lifted restrictions imposed under Foreign Assets Control
Regulations that blocked assets of Vietnam and designated nationals in the
United States. 39 The move followed the 1994 agreement between the two
countries that lifted the U.S. trade embargo.
* The United States also partially suspended sanctions against Yugoslavia
36. Exec. Order No. 12,981, 3 C.F.R. or 60 Fed. Reg. (1995).
37. See, e.g., "Clinton Administration, Industry Wrangle Over Encryption De-Control," Export
Practitioner, Sept. 30, 1995.
38. 60 Fed. Reg. 65,526 (1995) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. Parts 771, 779, 799).
39. 60 Fed. Reg. 12,885 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 500.578).
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(Serbia and Montenegro) as a reward for Serbia's support of the Dayton
accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina. 4°
* By contrast, President Clinton tightened the U.S. embargo against Iran,
prohibiting all trade and investment with that nation in retaliation for the
Islamic Government's alleged support of international terrorism.
4
'
* In a high-profile judicial decision dealing with export controls, the Court
of International Trade upheld the authority of the president through the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) to prohibit importation
from China of certain defense articles under the Arms Export Control Act.42
Plaintiffs contended that the Arms Export Control Act does not authorize
import embargoes and challenged certain other aspects of ATF's decision.
The agency interpreted the Arms Export Control Act's grant of authority
to the president to control imports to include the ability to prohibit those
imports altogether, and the court deferred to that construction. 43 The court
also affirmed ATF's "authority to revoke current import permits in order
to achieve the stated purpose of the embargo," despite the importers' claims
that such action was unconstitutional and outside the scope of the statutory
authority."4
E. EXPORT PROMOTION
The U.S. Export-Import Bank (ExIm) for the first time last year adopted envi-
ronmental guidelines to govern its activities. The impact of ExIm's new environ-
mental sensitivity was almost immediate when ExIm decided not to support U.S.
companies bidding to participate in China's enormous Three Gorges dam project.
Environmentalists criticized the project, claiming it would create widespread
environmental degradation and destruction. Business groups and many Republi-
cans in Congress lambasted ExIm's decision. These groups generally have op-
posed the guidelines, although the new rules may not have played a formal role
in ExIm's decision on the China project.
ExIm is considering renewal of the guidelines during the first part of 1996.
As of this writing, ExIm has made no final decision on whether to retain the
guidelines.
F. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
The regime of antidumping and countervailing duties came under attack from
an unexpected source last year, as the members of the International Trade Com-
40. Pres. Determination No. 96-7, 60 Fed. Reg. 2,887 (1995). The determination left unchanged
the status of that country's blocked assets in the United States, pending resolution of outstanding
claims by Yugoslavia's successor states and others.
41. 60 Fed. Reg. 47,061 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 560).
42. B-West Imports v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 853 (CIT 1995); 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988).
43. B-West Imports, 880 F. Supp. at 860.
44. Id. at 862
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mission entered into an unprecedented public debate over the value of those laws.
The controversy erupted on June 30 with the release of a report by the International
Trade Commission staff that concluded that the antidumping and countervailing
duties scheme, while providing short-term benefits to the petitioning industries
in some instances, exacted substantial costs to the economy in other instances.45
The study estimated that the U.S. Gross Domestic Product would have been
$1.59 billion greater in 1991 if not for duties imposed under the two sets of laws.
Only International Trade Commission Chairman Peter Watson and Commissioner
Carol Crawford fully endorsed the study, while International Trade Commission-
ers Don Newquist and Lynn Bragg disapproved of both its conclusions and its
release.46
The antidumping and countervailing duties laws also encountered legislative
efforts aimed at eliminating negative effects of antidumping and countervailing
duties orders on users of imported goods. Rep. Philip Crane (R-Ill.), chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee's Trade Subcommittee, introduced
a bill in December 1995 that would allow Commerce temporarily to suspend
antidumping or countervailing duties on products that cannot be obtained from
U.S. producers. This short-supply measure attracts the support of some prominent
legislators, including House Ways and Means Committee Chairman William
Archer (R-Texas), but faces stiff opposition from others in Congress and from
the Commerce Department.
The enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act in 1994, which took
effect on January 1, 1955, made several changes to antidumping and countervail-
ing duties law. Both the Commission and the International Trade Commission
promulgated new procedures in 1995 to comply with the WTO requirements,
and the two agencies spent much of 1995 drafting proposed regulations to comple-
ment the substantive changes required by the WTO agreements and the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act.47
Several important new judicial decisions in 1995 in the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties area include:
* The Court of International Trade generally affirmed the International Trade
Commission's injury determinations in many steel dumping cases. The court
displayed a tendency-not always present in the Court of International
Trade-to defer to the International Trade Commission's experience and
expertise derived from years of steel proceedings. 8
45. ITC Report Finds Trade Remedy Laws Carry Overall Cost to U.S. Economy, BNA Manage-
ment Briefing, July 5, 1995.
46. The two remaining members-Vice Chairman Janet Nuzum and Commissioner David Rohr-
joined the study with reservations.
47. 60 Fed. Reg. 51,748 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 201,207) (Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing); 60 Fed. Reg. 25,130 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. Parts 353 and 355) (Interim Final Rule).
48. E.g., Stalexport v. United States, 890 F. Supp. 1053 (CIT 1995); Empresa Nacional Siderur-
gica, S.A. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 876 (CIT 1995).
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* The Federal Circuit settled a technical but important point in dumping analy-
sis in affirming the Court of International Trade's treatment of home-market
transportation costs. In Ad Hoc Comm. of AZ-NM-TX-FL Prod. of Gray
Portland Cement v. United States (Ad Hoc I), the Federal Circuit explained
that its earlier Ad Hoc I decision held that Commerce does not possess
" 'inherent authority' to deduct pre-sale home market transportation ex-
penses in the calculation of FMV [foreign market value]," but interpreted
Ad Hoc I narrowly as applying only to purchase price comparisons and as
silent on "the applicability of the COS [circumstances of sale] provision"
of the statute to such home-market transportation costs. 49 In Ad Hoc II, the
court permitted "such [pre-sale] expenses to be deducted as indirect expenses
under the COS provision for ESP [exporter's sales price] comparisons,
subject to the ESP offset cap." 5" For purchase price comparisons, the court
allowed such deductions only "if the expenses are determined to be directly
related to the sales at issue.""
* In a related case, Torrington Co. v. United States,52 the Federal Circuit
declined to extend the Ad Hoc I holding to the ESP context and also noted
that Ad Hoc I did not address the scope of Commerce's authority under the
COS provision of the antidumping statute. The court permitted Commerce
to adopt a flexible test to distinguish between direct and indirect expenses.
"Rather than treating all post-sale transportation expenses as direct and all
pre-sale transportation expenses as indirect, Commerce now looks to whether
the expenses are directly related to particular home-market sales." 53 Under
this approach, "some pre-sale transportation expenses are now regarded




A number of important court decisions in 1995 affected the mechanics of import
and export transactions. Easily the most notable was United States Shoe Corp.
49. 865 F. Supp. 857 (CIT 1994), aff'd, 1995 WL 596834 (Oct. 10, 1995) (unpublished disposi-
tion) (Ad Hoc 11); Ad Hoc Comm. of AZ-NM-TX-FL Prod. of Gray Portland Cement v. United
States, 13 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 67 (1994) (Ad Hoc 1); Ad Hoc I, supra
note 36, 865 F. Supp. at 862. At the time of the court's decision, the COS provision allowed Commerce
to adjust the FMV if needed due to unspecified "other differences in circumstances of sale" of the
subject products. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1988). Although the AD statutes experienced drastic
change with the passage of the URAA, the COS provision survived in nearly identical form. See
19 U.S.C. § 677b(a)(6)(C)(iii) (1994). In any event, because the Ad Hoc II case arose prior to the
effective date of the URAA, the court decided it under the former version of the statute.
50. Id. at 862.
51. Id. at 863.
52. 68 F.3d 1347, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
53. Id. at 1356.
54. Id.
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v. United States, in which a special three-judge panel of the Court of International
Trade declared the Harbor Maintenance Fee tax unconstitutional as applied to
exporters.55 The court ruled that the tax violated the Export Clause of the United
States Constitution.56 The court based its jurisdiction to consider the validity of
the tax on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) rather than on § 1581(a), dealing with protestable
decisions, as argued by the government. As a result, exporters may obtain tax
refunds even if they do not file a protest with the Customs Service. However,
a two-year statute of limitations applies to all claims. The court granted a stay
of enforcement of the judgment pending a possible appeal.57
* In International Business Machines. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
invalidated a federal excise tax imposed on U.S. beneficiaries of casualty
insurance obtained from foreign insurers for exported products. 58 Exporters
sometimes obtain the insurance to cover their products during shipment.
The court refused the government's invitation to disregard a 1915 Supreme
Court precedent, Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance v. United States,
which the government conceded was directly on point, despite the govern-
ment's contention that the longstanding case no longer constitutes good law.59
Under the reasoning of that 1915 decision, the court determined that the
tax was "in effect a tax upon the exported products themselves and thus
[a violation] of the Export Clause of the Constitution.' 6° The circuit
court expressly disclaimed authority to reject Thames & Mersey, but noted
that the Court may yet reconsider the 1915 decision.6 ' The Supreme Court's
recently announced intention to review the case may signal its willingness
to accept that invitation.
" In a seemingly straightforward decision that may have far-reaching conse-
quences for many importers, the Court of International Trade decided in
Intercargo Ins. v. United States that language routinely employed by Cus-
toms in its notices of extension of liquidation failed to comply with the
requirements of the applicable statute and, consequently, the extensions were
invalid.62 The statute and regulation at issue require that Customs articulate
one of three reasons provided in the statute for an extension. 63 In its notices,
Customs indicated simply that "Additional Time Is Required.' ' 64 The gov-
ernment has appealed the decision in Intercargo to the Federal Circuit. If
55. 907 F. Supp. 408 (CIT 1995).
56. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5 (providing that "no Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State").
57. Ct. No. 94-11-00668, 1995 WL 736335 (CIT Dec. 4, 1995).
58. 59 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 594 (1995).
59. 237 U.S. 19 (1915); IBM Corp., supra note 47, 59 F.3d at 1235-36.
60. Id. at 1235.
61. Id. at 1239.
62. 879 F. Supp. 1338 (CIT 1995).
63. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b); 19 C.F.R. § 159.12.
64. Intercargo, supra note 52, 879 F. Supp. at 1340.
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the lower court decision is upheld, thousands of importers may be entitled
to relief.
* In another procedural decision with important consequences for importers,
Pollack Import-Export Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed
the Court of International Trade and determined that mere failure to list
certain entries on a summons does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction
to grant relief with respect to those entries when the plaintiff sought relief
for the entries in its complaint.65
65. 52 F.3d 303 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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